ALIENS

HOW HAS THE COURT ADDRESSED ALIENAGE CLASSIFICATIONS?
The court cites that alienage classifications refer to discrimination against non-citizens.
The issue being discussed is when such discrimination is a denial of equal protection of the laws.
The court held that aliens are protected from discrimination because the equal protection clause explicitly says that no “person” shall be denied equal protection of the laws.
In addition, the court often held that the state and local laws that discriminate against aliens can be challenged on preemption grounds as well as for violation equal protection.
The Supreme Court has held that federal immigration laws wholly occupy the field and preempt state efforts to regulate immigration.
Furthermore, the court cited that sometimes the state and local laws can be challenged both based on equal protection and on preemption analysis.
The general rule is that the court uses strict scrutiny to evaluate discrimination against non-citizens.
However, the court discussed several exceptions where less than strict scrutiny is used.
The Supreme Court recognized that Congress maintains plenary power to regulate immigration, and thus has been deferential to federal statutes and presidential orders that discriminate against aliens.
Moreover, the court held case law establishing that alienage classifications related to self-government and the democratic basis review for federal laws that discriminated against aliens.
HOW HAS THE COURT ADDRESSED STRICT SCRUTINY AS THE GENERAL RULE?
In Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), the court held that alienage classifications must meet strict scrutiny
The court discussed welfare aliens.
The court questioned whether the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment prevents a state from conditioning welfare benefits either upon the beneficiary’s possession of the US citizenship, or if the beneficiary is an alien, upon his having resided in this country for a specified number of years.
The appellants argue initially that the States, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause, may favor U.S. citizens over aliens in the distribution of welfare benefits. The court stated that this distinction involves no “invidious discrimination” for the state is not discriminating with respect to race or nationality.
The court ruled that it is undisputed that the term “person” in this context encompasses lawfully admitted resident aliens as well as citizens of the U.S. and entitles both citizens and aliens to the equal protection of the laws of the state in which they reside.
Under the traditional equal protection principles, a state retains broad discretion to classify as long as its classification has a reasonable basis. In addition, the court cites that a state retains broad discretion to classify an alien in “the area of economics and social welfare.”
In U.S. v. Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144 (1938), the court stated that for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.
In consequence, the court established that classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class are a prime example of a “discrete and insular” minority “special public interest”
On occasion, the court held state statutes that treat citizens and noncitizens differently, the ground for distinction having been that such laws were necessary to protect special interests of the state or its citizens.
Furthermore, the court stated a state’s desire to preserve limited welfare benefits for its own citizens is inadequate to justify restricting benefits to citizens and longtime resident aliens. In addition, “a state has a valid interest in preserving the fiscal integrity of its programs. But a state may not accomplish such a purpose by invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens…The saving of welfare costs cannot justify an otherwise invidious classification.”
The court reasoned that since an alien as well as a citizen is a “person” for equal protection purposes, a concern for fiscal integrity is no more compelling a justification
The court held that a state statute that denies welfare benefits to resident aliens and one that denies them to aliens who have not resided in the US for a specified number of years violates the equal protection clause.
In Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973), the court held that strict scrutiny is the appropriate test for discrimination against aliens and held that it was impermissible for states to require citizenship as a condition for practicing law.
HOW HAS THE COURT ADDRESSED ALIENAGE CLASSIFICATONS RELATED TO SELF-GOVERNMENT AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS?
The Supreme Court held that strict scrutiny is the general rule when the government discriminates against aliens but there is an important exception stating that only rational basis review is used for alienage classifications related to self-government and the democratic process.
The Supreme Court stated that “a democratic society is ruled by its people.”
In Perkins v Smith, 426 U.S. 913 (1976), the court held that a state may deny aliens the right to vote or hold political office, or serve on juries but the government Interests must be compelling
The court altered the level of scrutiny when the alienage classification relates to self-government and the democratic process.
In Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978), the court discussed the New York police against aliens.
The court questioned whether a state may constitutionally limit the appointment of members of its police force to citizens of the U.S.
Here, the court states that pursuant to a New York statute, state authorities refused to allow Foley to take the examination. The statute provides that “no person shall be appointed to the New York state police force unless he shall be a citizen of the U.S.”
The court reasoned that it would be inappropriate, however to require every statutory exclusion of aliens to clear the high hurdle of “strict scrutiny,” because to do so would “obliterate all the distinctions between citizens and aliens, and thus depreciate the historic values of citizenship.”
The court stated that the scrutiny will not be so demanding where we deal with matters firmly within a state’s constitutional prerogatives.”
In consequence, the court ruled that the state needs to only justify its classification by a showing of some rational relationship between the interest sought to be protected and the limiting classification.
Thus, the court cited that it is clear that a state may deny aliens the right to vote, or to run for elective office, for these lie at the heart of our political institutions. Similar considerations support a legislative determination to exclude aliens from jury service.
In similar, the court recognized that citizenship may be a relevant qualification for fulfilling those “important non-elective executive, legislative, and judicial positions,” held by “officers who participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy.
Moreover, the court reasoned that in the enforcement and execution of the laws the police function is one where citizenship bears a rational relationship to the special demands of the particular position. Therefore, a state may, consonant with the U.S. Constitution, confine the performance of this important public responsibility to citizens of the United States.
Justice Marshal, Brennan and Stevens dissenting, even if the court rejects this analysis, it should not uphold a statutory discrimination against aliens, as a class, without expressly identifying the group characteristic that justifies the discrimination.
In Amback v. Norwik, 441 US 68 (1979), the court questioned whether a State consistently with the equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, may refuse to employ as elementary and secondary school teachers aliens who are eligible for US citizenship but who refuse to seek naturalization.
The court cites N.Y. Education law Section 3001(3) that forbids certification as a public school teacher of any person who is not a citizen of the U.S., unless that person has manifested an intention to apply for citizenship.
The court refused because public education, like the police function, “fulfills a most fundamental obligation of government to its constituency.” In addition, the court reasoned the importance of public schools in the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens and in the preservation of the values on which our society rests.
In addition, the court reasoned that within the “governmental function” principle recognized in Sugarman and Foley, the Constitution requires only that a citizenship requirement applicable to teaching in the public schools bear a rational relation.
The court ruled the “narrow exception that applies only if it is specifically tailored to those who “participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy, and hence perform functions that go to the heart of representative government”