RE: OCDB and Downvotes | A #NewSteem approach
I believe he meant to say we don't want to seem as if we want to damage the business of other bid bots on purpose for our own sake. The way the EIP already has changed the behavior to using bid bots and @ocdb as well in a very short time span is a very good sign for the future use of responsible and thoughtout bids from the services. Dare I say it almost seems difficult to find posts to downvote right now, I'm guessing they are figuring out other ways in smaller scales to abuse them.
At the same time @ocdb is not a "business" per se as it is nonprofit and while we try out best to mitigate abuse which usually does not happen often because users got on there through curation we'd right now at least prefer to find some "easier" posts to identify and downvote than to judge each bid botted trending post individually.
Yeah, you're right about this. There is definitely a lot of value in looking for the more hidden abuses right now. I just don't think we can rule out that complacency sets in and it becomes harder to maintain momentum on healthy downvoting. I hope that doesn't happen but I fear it might.
Sure, but treating that as a blanket reason for all bidbots to never downvote the others even when they are out of line just becomes a damaging cartel. I don't think we want to encourage that. The focus should stay on whether particular cases (payouts) are appropriate to the content or not. You can almost ignore who voted for it entirely. Actually, that's a good way to entirely avoid the issue you stated: Make a policy not to look at all at who voted when deciding to downvote.
Yeah, I'm sure we'll get to a more mature stage where downvotes aren't taken as personal from both customers and bid bot owners over time. Luckily many of them seem to have adapted well to the EIP and are using their downvotes too, wish I could say the same about some others but maybe they'll also get there before they run dry from delegations or start some idiotic retaliations. There are still a lot of these cases like the one we are gonna focus on now, we'll take them one at a time and see how they react and respond and hopefully they'll see it as a positive change and adapt along with the rest of the community.
"...bidbots to never downvote the others even when they are out of line just becomes a damaging cartel."
This is precisely the scenario that I warned about pre-fork. With the curve changes it means that most smaller accounts actually NEED to boost their post to keep pace with previous post values. If we are also enabling a cartel of post boosters then STEEM will have become totally captured.
The former won't work. People keep making this prediction/claim/suggestion but it is really mathematically impossible. If most smaller accounts try to boost their posts they will end up blocking each other and driving the breakeven point higher. The reward pool is fixed size. Everyone can't be an "above average driver", to borrow an absurdity from the famous survey. It will always remain out of reach.
In addition, and by design, by boosting their posts higher in hopes of reaching some elusive break-even point, they make them more visible and attractive to downvotes. So, even if it could work, which it can't, it won't work in practice.
The latter is a bigger concern because it is at least mathematically possible. We will have to see how it works out, but from a starting point we should at least state clearly that it isn't socially desirable for that to happen and try to enlist agreement on that point. Yeah, I know we can't depend on that, but it can't hurt.
Just because it may be mathematically impossible if EVERYONE tries to do it, does not mean that some won't attempt to - even feel further incentivised to do so. It is the sort of situation where perception is reality and this comes down to understanding human psychology. It is game theory, not mathematics.
I know for a fact there are people who haven't used vote-selling services in the past but are now considering doing so to "stay ahead of the curve" (pun intended).
Some sort of consensus amongst whales, witnesses and vote-sellers about incentivising more vote-selling not being a "socially desirable" outcome would be good to see. I won't hold my breath ;)
Sure, and in raising up their posts they will make them more visible to potential downvoters. That's the purpose behind the curve. With some further evidence we might want to refine the parameters a bit but the fundamental idea is sound.
An author with a small payout might, in cases where the post is marginal, actually be better off leaving well enough alone and taking the smaller payout with less visibility.
Anyway, it doesn't really matter what happens in one particular case or another. What matters is that which becomes systemic, and my point about mathematical impossibility is that it isn't impossible for low-payouts to systemically escape the curve by buying votes. Some might, but only by volunteering to stand out from the crowd and be scrutinized.
I'd expect that most half-decent authors would want to stand out from the crowd and be scrutinised.
Sure. If you stand out and don't get downvoted, then you deserve the rewards. Even if you did pay for a vote or two to get noticed, it isn't that bad. Before long you will have your own followers, get resteemed, have regular voters, etc.
The curve offers lower(but still some) rewards to anyone without (much) scrutiny but if you move up the curve enough to get higher rewards, then it comes with scrutiny.
"...if you did pay for a vote or two to get noticed, it isn't that bad. Before long you will have your own followers, get resteemed, have regular voters"
Exactly. Doesn't that sound like a good pitch for a vote seller to use when drumming up new business?
Hey! Smooth, budy, I understood that I was wrong! My apologies! Let`s be friends! No need to proceed please... Thank you! Regards, Profit Shooter