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RE: How Vote Incentivization Degrades Delegated Proof of Stake
I am just wondering, did you take in account that users will try to get the set of witnesses that maximise their profit?
I did, yes. :) There's a bit of set theory in the proof that I glossed over, regarding the convergent set basically being the quickest to the bottom. But a given subset converges to the same isomorphic maximum set (of all 100%), and which subset wins is actually arbitrary for the proof. They all work.
On a more game theory side, every witness giving dividend seems like a natural equilibrium.
That's right, that's kind of the point of the proof. It's equivalent to lowering the block reward when done in unison. But the block reward is there for a reason, no?
Looking forward to more comments from ya! :)
Reading the primer. I will do dive in the proof part later ;-)
Do you view vote buying as a one time thing compared to vote incentivizing which is more recurrent?
Aren't you assuming that the only interest in voting will be monetary as soon as there are dividends? This is rather a pessimistic view that no one will vote for other reasons like security. I have to admit I totally think the same, unfortunately.
This scenario would happen if there is no cooperation between witnesses (to agree on prices) and no cooperation between users( let's make Pool A number 1 to earn more) . But we all know consensus is hard to achieve and the incentive to be selfish would be greater.
I am thinking of another equilibrium: the witness offers dividends until she reaches a certain position, say TOP 20 or 10. At this position, it is much harder for to get kicked out, so the witness can stop or lower the dividends and not look at the dividend market. What do you think?
By the way, I view those witness pools as a way for small witnesses to compete with the big players and companies we (will) have around here. EOS is a perfect example of what I expect to happen from a DPOS chain.