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RE: Operation Barbarossa - An Alternative History Thought Exercise
My issue is your assertion of the US being unprepared for war politically. While the mass of people were uninterested in war, along with their representatives, FDR viewed war as inevitable and acted to provoke Japan into fighting (the Japanese oil embargo). Concerning the scenarios where the US is transplated into the Russian landmass, an invasion would likely have mobilized the public immediately, as the attack at Pearl Harbor did. Given the increased threat from a German invasion, I'd argue it would have happened even more rapidly than it did in our history.
I'd agree with you that FDR was ready for war, however America was not. In the political speeches of the time isolationism was a prominent sentiment and FDR had some problems getting Lend Lease passed. In Churchill's writings, he emphasises this point in regard to the commission sent to the USA to obtain weapons and other war materials.
As regards the People's will to fight, this was a point that my Bulgarian friend found difficult. In my opinion the history of the USA in regard to irregular warfare, the number of private weapons (particularly in rural areas) and strong educational foundation suggests that a very strong irregular campaign would have been waged from the very first. Here time was of the essence and the results of the Tennessee exercises of 1941 indicate that the US Army would not have had the ability to stall the German army for long enough for the nation to fully make the transition to war. As I point out, should America be ready there was no nation on earth that could stand against the industrial might and technological flexibility of the USA.
I suppose my question really is: how did you make a determination as to how long it would take for the US to fully transit to war-readiness?
That is most certainly the point that was most subjective in my research and so I went with the actual mobilisation and expected that the circumstances would allow for a 50% increase in speed for raising and training of regular troops, accepting a reduction in troop quality into the bargain. Partizans would become active immediately and I expected in numbers outstripping the Soviet example.
The numbers I expected would have been around 500,000 regular troops available (The National Guard being merged with the Regulars prior to June 22nd) in 9 infantry, 1 Cavalry and 2 armoured divisions that were combat ready. Conscription had begun in 1940 and further units were coming online, around 35 divisions (including the regulars) were in existence, although the majority of these remaining units were still mobilizing. The US Army expected to raise 4 divisions per month to reach a full strength of around 114 divisions; this strength was never reached. Taking my 50% rule, expected mobilisation would be 6 divisions per month, in fact mobilisation was at roughly 50% what was expected (training and equipping units being more difficult than anticipated), therefore a further 3 combat divisions could be mobilised per month in this analysis. Using Soviet historical increases in force, this strength could not have been achieved.
My expectation would be that the initial attack of 160 divisions would be met by 25 to 30 divisions. These divisions would be far more effective than their Soviet counterparts, being at full strength, well equipped, supplied and motivated, but numbers would tell. Even given FDR's unrealised hope of a 1.4 million man force to be ready in 1941, the shear weight of the near 4 million man invasion force is too much to be held by these forces.
I also accepted in this analysis that the nature of German and their allies forces was to field under strength units, the American army generally kept it's formations at full strength and effectiveness. None of this affects the outcome though, the US government would have to withdraw to a more defensible location east of the Urals and negotiate from there.
The lack of Hitler's racial imperatives would have left a diplomatic settlement a probability. A political coup would most likely have occurred and negotiations conducted, probably ceding Ukraine & possibly the Caucasus to Germany, leaving Russia intact.
In scenario 3 where I suggested that the outcome for the USA would be identical, it was a poor choice of words, the result would be similar, but the time taken for Germany to achieve this would be longer in my opinion.
Thank you for the clarification. I understand where you're coming from and have to agree with your conclusions. I like that you mentioned partisans and irregular warfare, as well. I've always felt that an invasion of the homeland would be met with extensive resistance on an individual level.
Overall this was an awesome thought exercise. I'm a great fan of alternate history, and this was carefully thought-out. Good work! :D
Many thanks, I have been interested in the development of warfare in North America for many years, the interest developing from the Regiment I served in once bearing the title of The 60th or Royal American Regiment of Foot. Both social and military history point to a vigorous and extensive partizan campaign in such circumstances. I had to get my Bulgarian friend to look into the wars of the 18th and 19th centuries before he got the point, it is an aspect of America that is too often forgotten.
Thank you for the clarification. I understand where you're coming from and have to agree with your conclusions. I like that you mentioned partisans and irregular warfare, as well. I've always felt that an invasion of the homeland would be met with extensive resistance on an individual level.
Overall this was an awesome thought exercise. I'm a great fan of alternate history, and this was carefully thought-out. Good work! :D
Many thanks, I have been interested in the development of warfare in North America for many years, the interest developing from the Regiment I served in once bearing the title of The 60th or Royal American Regiment of Foot. Both social and military history point to a vigorous and extensive partizan campaign in such circumstances. I had to get my Bulgarian friend to look into the wars of the 18th and 19th centuries before he got the point, it is an aspect of America that is too often forgotten.