The problem of an African epistemology: Can the Igbo have a theory of knowledge?

Introduction

Everyone, in a sense, desires to know and to learn (Ndubisi 2014: 32) yet stating that one can have an African epistemology is still to a certain degree problematic (Udefi 2014: 108). One can therefore ask, “Is it possible to have an African epistemology?”. This question is part of the bigger problem of the possibility of African philosophy. In the following essay I will try and show that an African philosophy is possible, by implication then also that an African epistemology is possible. I will then give the Igbo’s epistemology as an example of an African epistemology.

The possibility of an African philosophy

African philosophy is rarely mentioned inside of philosophy. The West perceives the African as pre-logical or incapable of doing philosophy (Ramose 2015: 1). African philosophers and writers responded to these false claims with their own justifications for the capability of doing philosophy; in doing so a new field in African philosophy was created (Sogolo in Oyeshile 2008: 57) This further problematized the debate about African philosophy. Does responding to these false claims constitute African philosophy?

In Four trends in current African philosophy Henry Oruka (2005) identified four different kinds of philosophy done by Africans: ethno-philosophy, philosophic sagacity, nationalist-ideological philosophy, and professional philosophy. The first two, ethno-philosophy and philosophic sagacity, can be grouped together as traditionalists who “emphasize the present in relation to the past” and who are on a journey to the “discovery of authentic African ideas and thought systems uninfluenced by alien accretions” (Oyeshile 2008:60). This group is also particularists who approach African philosophy with emphasis on cultural influences, communal thinking, religious approaches, and so on. (Ikuenobe 1997:189). The latter two, nationalist-ideological philosophy, and professional philosophy, can be grouped together as universalists, who “emphasizes the present in relation to the future” and whose focus is more on Western philosophy (Oyeshile 2008:60; Ikuenobe 1997:189). Oyeshile (2008: 62) also states that the African philosopher must be concerned about the promotion of the African world view. He goes further and suggests that African philosophy is also an attempt to make cultural aspects (such as myths, faith, etc.) relevant to the needs of Africans without any dogmatic and Western methodology.

Some authors question if this is philosophy, especially of the first two groups. Gyekye (in Anthony 2014: 92), for instance, states that the attempt to understand why we are here can be seen as philosophy, implying that everyone can do philosophy. Philosophy is also not like science which promotes theories to be tested and/or falsified (Hallen in Oyeshile 2008:60). Philosophy, in a sense, is putting forward a different perspective about the world, therefor not restricted to a group. If the last mentioned is accepted, talking about African philosophy is not problematic (Kaphagawani en Malherbe 2005: 259). If this is the case, we can move on to talk about an African epistemology.

African epistemology

What is “African” epistemology? Is it different from, say, Plato or Descartes, and if so, what makes it different? Is it African because an African is doing it? Is it African because of some unique perspective not accessible by Westerners? Kaphagawani and Malherbe (2005: 260) states that epistemology can be seen as universal, but that the way of acquiring knowledge differs from context and culture. Kwasi Wiredu (in Airoboman and Asekhauno 2012: 13-14) gives, for example, his own epistemological theses: (1) ‘truth is opinion’; and (2) ‘to be is to be known’. Some authors also claim that African epistemology is “separate and superior” to that of the West (Airoboman and Asekhauno 2012: 14). Ruch and Anyanwu (in Airoboman and Asekhauno 2012: 15) states for instance that more than just reason is used by the African to gain reliable knowledge, in contrast to the West:
           “Knowledge therefore comes from cooperation of all human faculties and experience. He sees, feels, imagines, reasons or thinks and insults all at the same time. Only through this method does he claim to have the knowledge of the other. So the method through which the African arrive at trustworthy knowledge of reality is…intuitive and [a] personal experience.”
So far, we identified that Africans can indeed do philosophy and also epistemology. I will now discuss Igbo epistemology.

Igbo epistemology

The Igbo uses different levels and methods to gain knowledge. Language plays an important role in this, especially the use of proverbs. Kanu (2014: 165) states that without proverbs “the language of the Igbo would be but a skeleton without flesh, a body without a soul”. Translation of these proverbs and concepts into English from Igbo proves to be very difficult, sometimes no translation can be made. For the purpose of the essay two terms are important, that of "Amamife" and "nchekwube". “Amamife” is roughly translated to knowledge or wisdom (Nnam 2007: 128), and "nchekwube" translates to belief. The Igbo uses these words to distinguish between what knowledge or understanding is and what beliefs or opinions are (Udefi 2014: 114).

"Amamife", or knowledge, is what can be confirmed by sensory experiences, and which is reasonably reliable to believe as true and justified. First-hand experience is thus very important (Udefi 2014: 114). The Igbo formulates the following as a guide for certain knowledge: What I see with my eyes and which my mind or consciousness supports (ihe mfuru na anya ma uche kwado kwa ya) (Udefi 2014: 114). Amamife, as stated above, can also be translated into wisdom. Wisdom, or knowledge, was preserved, for instance, in proverbs and by the elder and sages due to the lack of written tradition. Ogoko (2008: 19) states it as follows:
           “Given the non-availability of texts in this area, we need to rely on the retrievability of the oral as preserved and encased in proverbs, idiomatic and figurative expressions (immaterial aspect of culture), as well as the visible material aspects of the practice, hence orality on text. There are certain statements that are monumentalized as traditions, as the words of our elders, which are always there and are open for the ever-ongoing dialectic, and discourses of our environment.”

“Nchekwube”, or beliefs, on the other hand, are non-direct experiences or second-hand experiences. These are things the Igbo “accept on trust, faith and confidence” because there is no “reliability or certainty” to them (Udefi 2014: 114). These “second-hand” accounts of knowledge are not generally accepted as reliable, unless it comes from an authority figure. The Igbo has three such authority figures whose “second-hand information” is trusted: that of the elders (ndichie), title holders (Ozo) and native doctors (dibie afa) (Udefi 2014: 114).

This seems relatively the same as in the West, but the Igbo places a different and unique emphasis on the relationship between knowledge, truth and morality. When someone has knowledge, the Igbo states that the person also possesses truth. In contrast, someone who is a liar cannot possess any knowledge, because knowledge appears only in those who have moral status and are accepted as morally worthy (Udefi 2014: 115). Udefi (2014: 115) states, for example, that “The Igbo would almost equate [a] knowledgeable person (onye amamife) with [a] truthful person (onye ezi-okwu)”.

A hierarchical model of knowledge can be put forward. At the top of the model, is reliable knowledge from first-hand experience. Secondly, there are beliefs which can be tested against previous experiences. And thirdly at the bottom, there are beliefs which cannot be tested, this is generally seen as an unreliable way of gaining knowledge.

There are cases where the Igbo do not use this method of gaining knowledge, and rather rely on spiritual explanations, for something like death, but Udefi (2014: 115) suggests that these explanations should not be dismissed immediately. For him, it is simply a way for the Igbo to make sense of something knowledge or beliefs cannot explain.

Using what has been said, two different ways of gaining knowledge can be identified. Firstly, there is empirical knowledge, or knowledge gained from first-hand experience. Two terms related to this type of knowledge is used by the Igbo: “Mmuta” which means learned knowledge, and “Nka” which means knowledge that is gained from reason, including inductive reasoning. Udefi (2014: 114) gives an example of this reasoning:
           “A two-legged goat that is presented to an Igbo man will obviously contradict his past experiences that all goats have four legs and hence he has every reason to doubt his present sensory experience and all epistemic beliefs based on it.”
Ogoko (2008: 18) also says that:
           “The Igbo [are] as empirical as [they are] rational. [They] employ [their] organs of sight, sound, taste, touch, and perceiving in interacting with [their] environment.”

Secondly, there is knowledge gained from the oral tradition (like proverbs), knowledge from the sage or divination knowledge. Ogoko (2008: 17) says of this type of knowledge that:
           “The primary objects of Igbo knowledge are God [Note, not the Christian God], Spirits, ancestors and material substances. God is an eternal rationality, infinite immaterial substance, and supreme in essence. He is all powerful, hence being called the most Supreme Being.”
Emphasis is also placed on the knowledge of the elders, for example, with the following proverb: “what the old man saw while sitting, a child will not see even if he climbs a height”. The importance of proverbs in gaining knowledge is noted by Kanu (2014: 164):
           “[Proverbs] occupy a central place in Igbo discourses. It is like oil used in preparing an Igbo speech. Just like oil adds flavour and makes the soup appealing, Igbo proverbs add integrity to the speech of an Igbo person. If the Igbo speak in plain and simple language without spicing it up with proverbs, his talk will look inexperienced and childlike.”

Conclusion

Ogoko (2008: 14-15) states that:
           “The Igbo seeks to know and to understand, to explain and to describe his [or] her experiences and grasps of realities. Such sifts are articulated as our world-view. From it a body of knowledge is constructed.”
One can also state, following Udefi (2014: 116), that “[The Igbo] were motivated by the theoretical need to establish a basis for the discourse of African epistemology”. The discussion above clearly shows the Igbo’s way of defining, gaining and justifying knowledge. I conclude with Ramose (2015: 8) “At bottom this fallacy [that the African cannot do philosophy] is expressive of the wish to appropriate experience and history for the sake of sustaining the undying myth that only one segment of humanity has a prior, superior, and exclusive right to reason [and claims to knowledge]. Without this wish there is no need to posit the question whether or not there can be an African philosophy.”

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