An idealistic critique of truth and logic

Following my previous articles on idealist metaphysics and epistemology, I will put forth my ideas regarding its consequences on truth and logic. Basically my epistemology says:

I experience X, then I know X

The problem though is to identify or categorise what X can be and what it cannot be. I will argue that how this X "arrives" is in the form of a concept, which is activated by sense data in the now. If I ask you to imagine an elephant, you can sort of recreate a faint kind of idea of how an elephant would be experienced, if you had the sense data.

This means that the concepts used to identify X, are saved in a sort of memory or cognitive apparatus, which can be accessed even if there are no particular X in the moment. This corresponds to David Hume´s notion of "impressions" and "ideas" as the two basic forms consciousness can wield. Importantly it is to note that I consider this the same concept but either appearing as an idea (faint) or an impression (strong) and will activate different kind of emotions, who's initiation cannot be controlled.

For instance if you see a photograph that activates the concept "tiger", you will not get the same emotional state as if you have the impression "tiger". In fact, the case may even be that it is the emotional connection that makes up the difference, but that is mere guesswork.

Truth

Concept in themselves cannot be sensed, but only activated when the right set of sense data, the attributes of the concept, in the right strength arrives at the perceptive part of consciousness. But at the same time, it is only the concept itself that can be apt for truth statements, not the attributes. Any attribute can in principle be an attribute of any other concept. In other words, the attributes are not truth apt.

An important aspect of idealistic epistemology is that - either you have a particular X active in you mind or you don't. And I will then argue that talking about true or false about a certain concept appearing in your mind, does not make any sense. If there is no impression, you cannot claim truth at all in the first place, no matter what. At the same time, you cannot claim anything to be false either, as you have no way of knowing if you actually should have any particular impression.

So, an impression, in and of itself, is not truth apt. It either is there or it isn't. Expressing a proposition about it will not increase your knowledge either, but it can be used by other individuals to get an idea of your impression and potentially establish an objective truth.

The limitations of objective truths are:

• Either of the individuals "agreeing" on an objective truth cannot know if any of the other individuals are lying
• Truth, and therefore a proposition, is only possible in the now, since sense data is only available in the now

Logic

Logic is based on one or more premises, by which necessary conclusions are derived .The premises do not need to be true for the logical statement to draw a conclusion, but the correct conclusion can only be drawn if the correct truth/falsehood are dragged from the propositions that underlie the premises.

I would argue though that logic is inherent in the way individual concept formation/destruction/change is done. The appearance and disappearance of concepts is not as such initiated by reasoning but by changes in sense data that either creates, changes or removes concepts in cognition.

But let us take an example. A well known syllogism roaming around in popular philosophy, is:

a. Socrates is a man
b. All men are mortal
c. Therefore Socrates is mortal

Concerning a:

I would say that "man" is the concept and "Socrates" is the attributes, if even that much can be said of "Socrates". But if anything, "Socrates" are specific shapes, colours, smells (so I have read) and so on. "Man" is the activated concept, that is not sensed.
Another problem is that unless you directly sense "Socrates", you do not know "Socrates". And if you do not know it you cannot call it true. Therefore the syllogism would fall.
If on the other hand you do know "Socrates", "a." should instead read "A man is Socrates".

Concerning b:

Do you have knowledge of "all men"? I am not saying it is impossible to obtain, but since there are 8 billion "men" in the world as of writing and they all have to die at the same time (in the now) for you to know that they are mortal, I find it highly unlikely, not to say as good as impossible to know.
Another thing is the attribute "mortal". Mortality is a kind of artificial "attribute" that cannot be sensed, and therefore cannot be true. If an individual stops living, you know that they are "mortal" in the moment when you experience it, but only then. Therefore a person cannot "be" mortal. it is non-sensical.

Concerning c:

"Socrates" is attributes that cannot be sensed because it is in the past. Mortality is artificial attributes and cannot be sensed. Referring to the argumentation above it really is a fallacy to claim "Socrates is mortal". it is a faulty statement that does not work.

Thank you for reading :-)