Kripke's Modal Argument Against Type Identity Theory

in #philosophy • 8 years ago (edited)

What is Kripke’s Modal Argument against the type identity theory? How can the identity theorist defend their position against Kripke?

Type-type identity theory falls under direct criticism from Saul Kripke. Type identical implies an equivalence in ‘type’, which goes so far as to imply that the mental kinds are the C-fibers firing themselves. In other words, they “[...] are contingently identical […] and theoretically reducible [...]” (IEP)

Here I endorse Kripke’s Modal Argument against the type identity theory. This is done by elucidating Kripke’s argument, discussing its implications for identity theorists and weighing the points against each other to discern why he comes out on top.

The tools laid out in Kripke’s ‘Naming and Necessity’ build into his argument against type identity theory. The tool that takes center stage for this argument is the concept of rigid designators. More specifically, Kripke furthers the view that proper names are rigid designators.

Kripke, however, in holding the view that proper names are rigid designators, is forced to also believe that “every identity statement involving proper names is either necessarily true or necessarily false” (Cohen, 12). As he says, “... the identity of pain with the stimulation of C-fibers, if true, must be necessary”. He holds that this “... means that the identity theorist is committed to the view that there could not be a C-fiber stimulation which was not a pain nor a pain which was not a C-fiber stimulation” (Kripke, 331). But as one can imagine a world where pain is not necessarily the stimulation of C-fibers “... the correspondence between a brain state and a mental state seems to have a certain obvious element of contingency” (Kripke, 333).

Kripke’s Modal Argument against type identity theory can be presented in the following argument form:

  1. If pain = stimulated C-fibers, then necessarily pain = stimulated C-fibers.
  2. It’s not necessary that pain = stimulated C-fibers
  3. Therefore, pain is not identical with the stimulation of C-fibers. (from 1 and 2)

Kripke supports the second premise by explaining that it is logically possible for a world to exist in which pain is not the stimulation of C-fibers, which renders the identity theorist’s view obsolete. That might seem obscure to imagine, but one can suppose that he means conceptions of situations where this binary pair doesn’t match up as described. Thoughts like pain being the stimulation of D-fiber, or A-fiber and B-fiber combined come to mind. Or more plausibly, as the aforementioned would probably fall subject to Putnam’s XYZ, that pain can just be conceived of without C-fiber stimulation or vice versa.

All the above considered, the ball eventuates on the identity theorist’s side of the court. After all, Kripke shows the mental kind and C-fiber stimulation aren’t as identical as the identity theorist makes them out to be. So what are her possible responses?

One possible avenue is to take the direction of Smart and Place’s approach. What they did is best described as finding a middle ground. In their view, the identity between a mental event and C-fibers firing stands even if they drop the necessity. Roughly speaking, the first premise is changed to ‘If pain = stimulated C-fibers, then contingently pain = stimulated C-fibers”. Kripke’s second premise would consequently lose its argumentative weight as it’s left with pointing out the obvious. This approach is ill advised, however, as it’s a change in the very point that the type identity theorist originally sets out to prove. It would be less of a response, but more of a concession or capitulation to recede down this argumentative path.

The other option, and what Kripke argues as the better option, is to reject the second premise. He suggests that the identity theorist should take the avenue of denying that one can conceive of a world where this identity isn’t necessary. This produces the task of explaining away the alleged necessity between pain and C-fibers firing. This could be done by suggesting that heat = molecular motion is also contingent, and that our interpretation of it being necessary is mistaken. This avenue holds no promise however because the consensus of the identity of ‘heat’ and ‘molecular motion’ is that it’s rigid. Furthermore, Kripke insists that Putnam’s XYZ diffuses any appeal to an intuitive sense of contingency, as what’s really being imagined is the same thing under the guise of another. As he suggests, when presented with apparently contingent identity, what is most likely the cause of such an interpretation is an overemphasis on its appearance, as opposed to what it really is. If we can imagine heat that is not molecular motion, what we are really imagining is something that appears to be heat, or something that appears to be molecular motion, but actually isn’t.

So it seems that there is a lasting problem for identity theorist because allusions to contingency are readily diffused by Kripke. However, the only way that we can discern experiences of others is by appearances, so it seems futile to make that analogy between heat and pain. After all, the only way we can identify experiences in other people is through the way they appear to us.

Kripke’s Modal Argument against type identity theory presents a compelling challenge. By use of careful use of rigid designators, Kripke discerns that the type identity theorist is not as committed to his view as claimed. The identity theorist tries to retort by alluding to intuitions and conceivability considerations, which seem to fall short. And although Kripke’s responses to these counter arguments have the weakness of not being conclusive in shutting down the identity theorists, it tips the argument in his favor to await the identity theorist’s defense.

Sources:

Web:

Print:

  • Kripke, Saul A. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1980. Print.

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8 years ago in #philosophy by
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