You are viewing a single comment's thread from:
RE: DONATING 30SB TO STEEM PROPOSALS - Via a Theory Testing Proposal
Yes. In my proposal's post there's an ELI5 description with alice, bob and stuff.
Basically there's virtual queue of applicants ordered by amount of votes they gathered.
Then each hour payment is made accordingly up to requested amount, but obviously not more than Steem.DAO can pay (depends on gathered amounts).
Last maximum hourly payout was 1.849 SBD
So even if some proposal will get pass through my Return Proposal and will be first in queue, and want to grab everything there's to grab, then it won't currently get more than $2.
I don't recall the motive for this extreme difficulty in receiving any funding for proposals being clearly explained. Is this situation intended to be a temporary measure while bugs in the system are examined and fixed?
In theory the threshold is only as extreme as stakeholders choose. In practice the interface for deciding the threshold seems poor.
We should be able to vote conditionally; I should be able to set a vote which supports the proposal up to a certain Vest-vote level and not above it.
Posted using Partiko Android
Maybe I have misunderstood the intended design and function of the system here, but it looks to me that just like with the witness system, voters with high stakes are using tactics to limit the effectiveness of voting by everyone else as much as possible. For example, if I have millions of steem, I can vote for the return proposal using my own proxy accounts just enough that I get to roughly choose how many of the top voted proposals get funded. I can then use my large amount of funds to put proxy proposals in and vote for them, so that in practice, only my proposals get paid out. Isn't this likely/possible? Or have I misunderstood something here?
Yes. Blocktrades lone vote is worth 9,735 T which by it self nearly enough to choose which proposals are funded at this point. It's not total control but small stake holders barely matter here. This seems both reasonable and not reasonable. Unfortunately, a bicameral approach would require other metrics to guard against Cybil... and nothing that would suffice is in consensus or to my knowledge proposed elsewhere.
The proposal minimum is around 23 GV so it would take Blocktrades in agreement with another similar sized whale, and either another whale or many smaller accounts to support a proposal. There are also many whales whom have not voted for the return proposal and could increase that threshold.
Posted using Partiko Android
Blocktrades could remove their vote from proposal 0. Which would drop proposal 0 to 13GV and vote for any other proposal and raise it to 9.7Gv. For instance proposal 10 has 18 GV. So simply by removing a vote from proposal 0 @inertia will recieve funding for documentation.
That's true, but in lowering it, other whales can get proposals through also. Other whales can also raise the return proposal.
If Blocktrades is the only whale voting he can control everything. It doesn't take a huge amount of participation from other whales to change that though.
Posted using Partiko Android
Of course. It'll be the same gripes as witness voting... but I don't see better options. Just different options like voting for representative accounts to vote on funding allocation. The only given is the impossibility to make all parties happy.
It's a system where the largest accounts will decide what gets paid out - that much is true and was always going to happen with a stakeholder majority system.
It's not true that a large account (except possibly the Steemit accounts) can decide on their own what gets paid out - it requires the large stakeholders working together. Blocktrades as the second largest non-Steemit whale for example has less than half the vote threshold currently, and there are many more whales whom have not voted and can raise that threshold so that it would require even more whales being in agreement.