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RE: The Future of Steemit
Sorry, but in this particular situation, that diagnosis is wrong. n^2 helps prevent posts and comments that receive a low amount of upvotes from receiving high rewards. When users are upvoting to the degree that is happening here, n^2 would actually make it worse. The abusive votes would actually be worth more under n^2.
I totally agree on that. But changing the curation rewards to 40% will help create incentive to curate. At the end of the day, some things simply can't be done by bots and requires human input. That's why we need strong communities backed by steem inc's sp.
I heard you are a supporting the flag rewards program. Thanks for that.
There is a believe that paying more for curation is going to incentivize better curation. While I am sure there are some people that will be more incentivized by an additional 15%, I suspect that the vast majority of curators will still perform what I call "lazy curation", where their voting is not really adding a lot of value towards the discovery of quality content.
I think that the addition of communities will really help with the content discovery process, because users will be able to consume content that is more tailored to their individual interests. When SMTs are added on top of that, and communities can run their own "mini STEEM economy" around their individual tokens, I think we will see some really awesome outcomes, and the platform will really start to take off.
Yes, it sounded like a really smart approach to try and incentivize responsible downvoting. I hope it does well :)
Sorry, but that is only true if you isolate these posts from the rest of the rewardpool.
Under n^2 other posts with more r_shares would get much higher rewards, making it more profitable to combine r_shares.
This would create incentives for a curation process - just like intended in the original whitepaper.
The rewards that were distributed prior to the hardfork can be used as a base point. There was a certain threshold, I can’t remember what it was (guesstimate around $50) where the posts above it made less, and the posts below it made more when we switched to linear rewards.
For users who have more SP than that threshold, their vote is worth more under n^2 than linear.
The threshold does change of course as the price of STEEM goes up, and it also does fluctuate based on the voting behavior of all the users.
Regardless of the specific place the threshold exists at though, there will be users with enough SP to be above it, and for those users their votes add more under n^2 than under linear rewards.
I should have probably been a bit more precise with my original reply.
Under
nranchorelaxo has absolutely no incentive to vote for anything other than himself or his buddy haejin; His influence on the reward pool is always the same.Under
n^2, if he only voted for his buddy ( and nobody else voted for him - which is pretty much the case ) then he would have less influence on the reward pool than he has now.Sidenote: Before hf 19 he would have to vote for 40 comments, making your threshold totally inaccurate.
Either we are talking about different things or your math is wrong.
If we are just talking about the amount of rewards that a single user with his level of SP can reward to himself or his friends with his vote alone (no other significant votes) then he has more power under n^2.
You are right, 40 to 10 did change things. Even if you rolled back both changes though, he would still be able to extract more with 40 n^2 votes spread across 40 posts/comments than he can today with the 10 using linear.
I understand the argument of n^2. Under any system with moderately even distribution of stake, you are right about n^2, and it is a perfect system to combat this type of abuse. The problem is that with the distribution of STEEM, there is such a distance between the larger stakeholders and everyone else, that individual stakeholders can with their single vote essentially reach the tipping point or critical mass at which point their vote squared significantly surpasses the votes of a majority of the other voters and actually pulls more rewards, even though it is technically just ‘one vote’.
We are talking about the same thing and my math is alright.
There are simply too many parameters to give you any example numbers.
Did you not notice, how selfvoting only became a massive problem after hf19 ?
Even with the disproportional distribution STEEM has, this is not necessarily true.
First of all: If any other post had twice the votes, it would get 4 times the shares in rewards.
The effect of flags would change significantly, too.
A shareholder with half the SP could 'steal' more than half the payout of those abusive posts.
It would also have some indirect effects; As it would influence voting behavior.
There has been a dramatic increase in self voting since Hf 19. For the average user (even someone such as myself with a decently large amount of SP) our votes are worth more under linear rewards. For those of us on our end of the spectrum (most users) who want to use their voting power to reward themselves, self voting is more profitable under linear rewards when compared to n^2. That is why we have seen such an increase since the switch to linear rewards. I agree with you on that.
In the interest of not just repeating the same arguments over and over, since you don’t seem to agree with my point, maybe let’s just end with the above statement - since I know on that at least, we agree.
I will have the last word then:
My initial statement still stands strong.
I invite you to read my post on n^2.
I did not tag it #witness-category, although I could and probably should have.
I have read it.
Here are how rewards were distributed just prior to HF19.
I don't think n^2 is gonnna fix things. It has actually probably not got worse with linear rewards, but I've not seen a more recent version of this chart, so couldn't prove it.
Sadly, it is impossible to compare any data, since hf 19 brought a whole host of changes.
nI'd bet rewards distributions are practically indistinguishable.
Most of the Steem is still all of the power.
We said we would continue to collect ideas ... I would be curious what you are thinking about my newest one? (That's no call for an upvote: if you don't like it, just don't upvote it - I am interested in opinions.)
It would allow users who are exploiting the system by creating junk posts and upvoting for a ton of money because they own the account to extract a lot of money from the rewards pool.
Why? My idea was a reward curve which starts as n^2 and then later becomes linear (as explained in my article). That means at least one couldn't exploit it more easily than one could exploit n^2. It would combine the advantages of n^2 (flat start) with linear (no extreme rewards).
I’m not a blockchain dev, but I don’t think that could be implemented as a consensus operation because it is too expensive of a computation to have to perform on every vote.
I am not so sure if computation would be that expensive ... There had to be 'only' a vote counter to switch to a linear equation after a certain number of upvotes per post ... (OK, maybe a few other things as well ...)
You might be right that there wouldn't be any consensus (or maybe also straight rejection of the idea), but on the other side it won't cause much harm to discuss it for some minutes. ;-)
By the way I also wouldn't be angry at all if some of you busy witnesses (hey I voted for 30 of you, isn't that great!) would comment ideas like this one directly under my articles from time to time. :) (At least @felixxx did ...)
There are a lot of discussions on the topic. I'll keep the idea in mind, and bring it up if it seems appropriate.
If you have ideas that you want me to check out, feel free to send me a link on steemit.chat. As long as they are serious proposals and you aren't just link spamming me, I'm fine with you sending links :)
Thanks for that!
Oh, how on earth could you know that my preferred hobby is link spamming? OK, I will try not to do it that often in your case. :-)))