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RE: Bring torches and pitchforks to the antichrist justices of the 11th circuit

in #informationwar5 years ago

Very few things get documented. This man, Dennis Quinette, just wanted to make a phone call on his way back from court, where a just set a bond in his misdemeanor case. He tried to talk to the Gaurd [Reed] when he allowed another inmate to enter the transport holding area, and the Gaurd closed the door, then opened it to shove Quinette to the concrete floor breaking is hip. Notice the first thing the guard try to do was assert a defense, "You rushed me...yes you did yes you did". If Dennis were to say recover from shock and disorientation, that would be the first thing he was told and perhaps believe.

According to the order on the rule 24. Reed had a history of other abuses.

There, according to the Plaintiff, an inmate with a colostomy bag accused Reed of using excessive force by twisting the inmate's waist cuffs so that his colostomy bag ruptured. There was no video recording or eyewitness of this alleged incident. This allegation was determined to be unfounded, and no disciplinary action was taken against Reed.

There, Reed was booking an inmate into the Detention Center when the inmate made a comment that angered Reed. The inmate at that time was restrained in waist chain cuffs. Reed, angered by the comment, slammed the restrained inmate's face onto the floor. The inmate was sent to the hospital and received stitches. This incident was recorded on video.

Next, the Plaintiff alleges that in 2009 the Command Staff Defendants conducted another internal investigation into the use of excessive force by Reed. This investigation resulted from an incident where Reed attempted to "slam" a restrained inmate to the ground with a headlock, while that inmate was chained to a group of other inmates. Reed was angry at the inmate for cursing at him. Reed, by slamming the inmate to the ground, pulled the entire group of inmates back and forth. It was ultimately determined that Reed used excessive force.

And, in May 2015, Reed was once again the subject of an internal affairs investigation. This investigation involved allegations of favoritism toward inmates and violations of department policy. Specifically, Reed allowed segregation inmates to remain outside of segregation longer than Detention Center policy allowed, and also allowed a favored inmate out of his cell in violation of Detention Center policy. These actions resulted in a fight between segregation inmates.

The Plaintiff alleges that a number of other internal affairs investigations into Reed's conduct were conducted over the course of his employment.
https://casetext.com/case/quinette-v-reed

Judge thrash did allow a number of claims to go through in an individual capacity suit, including the rarely granted supervisor liability.

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in Murphy v. Cobb County Adult Detention Center

Murphy asked for an extra 30 days to respond to a motion to dismiss, but failed to answer and thus lost his opportunity to do so. Here he had got in a terrible care wreck and was attending physical therapy and was on prescription medication prior to his arrest. The jail followed up and just gave him a tylenol for his back pain. He sued. But without access to a law library it is difficult for a pro-se plaintiff to plead what he must to survive a section 1983 claim.

The Court finds no plain error in the Magistrate Judge’s finding that Plaintiff’s back pain does not constitute a serious medical need. See Slay 714 F.2d at 1095; see also Wilson v. Smith, 567 F. App’x 676, 678 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he medical need must be one that, if left unattended, poses a substantial risk of serious harm.”); Burley v. Upton, 257 F. App’x 207, 210 (11th Cir. 2007) (“lower back pain is not the type of serious condition this circuit requires” because it is not “so serious that ‘if left unattended, [it] pose[d] a substantial risk of serious harm.’”) (citations omitted). The Magistrate Judge found also that Plaintiff did not allege any specific factual allegations against Hendrix in that would put Hendrix on notice of the claim against him. (R&R at 10). The Magistrate Judge noted that Plaintiff alleges only that a “physician’s assistant” administered him Tylenol for his back pain and that Plaintiff was not referred to a “certified doctor.” (Id.; see also Compl. at 5). The Magistrate Judge found that these allegations do not connect Hendrix to the alleged denial of medical care or provide a basis for the Court to find that Hendrix knew of the alleged risk of harm to Plaintiff. (R&R at 10). The Magistrate Judge noted further that, at most, Plaintiff’s allegation regarding the physician assistant’s prescription of Tylenol constitutes a mere disagreement with the course of treatment, and does not constitute a deliberate indifference to his medical needs. (Id.). The Court finds no plain error in these findings or conclusions, and Plaintiff’s claims against Hendrix are required to be dismissed. See Slay 714 F.2d at 1095; see also Smith v. Florida Dep’t of Corr., 375 F. App’x 905, 910 (11th Cir. 2010) ( a “simple difference in medical opinion between the prison's medical staff and the inmate” regarding the course of treatment does not state an Eighth Amendment claim.”) (citations omitted);

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/georgia/gandce/1:2012cv03317/187774/42/

Grisby v. Cobb County Adult Detention Center et al, No. 1:2008cv03338 - Document 3 (N.D. Ga. 2008)
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/georgia/gandce/1:2008cv03338/154849/3/

Plaintiff sets forth the following allegations. He was admitted to the Cobb County Adult Detention Center on September 6, 2007, at which time he informed the medical staff that he was taking medication for both high blood pressure and post traumatic stress disorder(PTSD).Although he received his blood pressure medication the next day, he waited at least "a whole complete month" for his PTSD medications, perhaps longer,' despite submitting "numerous medical request[s]." (CvmpL ¶ IV.)Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages, as well as"any other damages" to which the Court deems him entitled, "for the physical andmental pain and suffering" caused by the alleged deprivation of his PTSD medications while at the Cobb County Adult Detention Center. (Id. ¶ V.) Plaintiff does not allege any specific consequences arising from this alleged deprivation.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits indifference to a serious medical need so deliberate that it "constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,104(1976)(citation and internal quotations omitted). "In this circuit, it is established that psychiatric needs can constitute serious medical needs and that the quality of psychiatric care one receives can be so substantial a deviation from
accepted standards as to evidence deliberate indifference to those serious psychiatricneeds." Steep v. Shah, 87 F.3d 1266, 1269(i l th Cir. 199b)

case dismissed.

However, Plaintiff alleges only that he experienced "physical and mental pain and suffering" as the result of being deprived of his PTSD medications. (Compl. ¶ V.) This "formulaic recitation" fails to state a claim for relief under § 1983. See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at1964-65(noting that "plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds' of hisentitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do") (citation omitted) (edits in original).'

As to his claim in equity:

Because Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at the Cobb County Adult Detention Center,he may not obtain injunctive relief in this case. See McKinnon v. Talladega County, 745 F.2d 1360,1363(11th.Cir.1984)(stating that, in general, "a prisoner's transfer or release from a jail moots his individual claim for declaratory and injunctive relief")

In Kendall et al v. Sutherland et al

https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/georgia/gandce/1:2013cv04263/201324/51

A sheriff's deputy was raping women. The sheriff knew of this, and failed to correct the situation. Mulltiple women sued. The sheriff was immune to all state claims per state level Sovereign immunity in state court, was immune to official capacity suit per sovereign immunity in federal court, but the court managed to allow a claim to move forward of deliberate indifference under section 1983.

qualified immunity was later granted when the sheriff could no longer find the grievances. Cough, spoliation.

https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/georgia/gandce/1:2013cv04263/201324/119/0.pdf?ts=1459513155

Plaintiffs present no evidence, however, that Sheriff Warren actually received these grievances. In fact, they appear to concede that these grievances were mishandled, meaning that they were not passed up along the chain of command. (Id. ¶¶ 48-49.) And Sheriff Warren presents evidence to precisely that effect. (Beck Decl., Dkt. [115-13] ¶ 79-83.) In his Declaration, Chief Deputy Beck specifically states that “[b]ecause the initial Jackson letter and grievance were not properly processed, neither one was brought to the attention of the Command Staff, including Sheriff Warren, until after Sutherland was arrested on January 17, 2013.” (Id. ¶ 83.) As for Ms. Jackson’s second grievance (filed on October 18, 2012), Chief Deputy Beck states that no copy has ever been found even though
Defendant Warren does not dispute that Ms. Jackson filed it. (Id. ¶ 53.)

Cobb county police: "We only kill black people"